Subversion Through Journalism

The following is the debriefing of a former Czech Intelligence Officer from Dezinformatsia, which shows how the journalists are used by the enemy state

Q. Let us focus on journalists. You stated in your 1980 Congressional testimony that during your time in the field, you were in contact with the director of a national television network in Western Europe. What other kinds of journalists did you recruit?

A. I did not personally make the recruitment approach, but instead conducted the spotting and assessing of the target. Someone else would conduct the actual recruitment. Therefore, if the operation failed, I would not be exposed. We recruited many more journalists on the left of the political spectrum than in the center or on the right. A range of techniques was used to hook the individuals. Subtle forms of blackmail were used in conjunction with money and the interaction of personalities (developing common interests and concerns). As with all recruitment, the objective was to establish a web of complicity that encircled the agent. Money was used to keep the person happy and producing.

Q. How did you use these journalist recruits? Were they used only to publish articles? What were the themes you focused on?

A. The primary responsibility of these journalists was to publish articles and stories, but these pieces did not emphasize support for Soviet policy. Rather, the major focus concentrated on undermining the United States and NATO, and on creating rifts between West Germany and France or between the United States and its allies. The principal theme argued that the NATO alliance was disintegrating because the United States was militaristic, dangerous, and not sensitive to European needs. For example, in West Germany the United States was charged with ignoring German heritage and culture during the pose-war occupation, and with forcing alien institutions and political culture on the German people. West Germany was presented to the French and to other Europeans as harboring strong Nazi tendencies, and it was claimed that many war criminals had been reinstated into positions of political power in the West German government. This was presented as extremely dangerous for all of Europe.

Q. How did you get the journalists to produce? Did you provide completed articles for them to publish?

I knew of no situation in which completed articles were passed to an agent. This would be operationally awkward, and might end up revealing the association. The reason I say this is because it is extremely difficult to copy someone else’s writing style. I did provide guidelines for the agent to follow. These consisted of a two-or-three page outline of objectives and themes to be covered in a given article. After I had provided these guidelines, the agent then would produce the story. Sometimes I would include materials and information he could draw upon.

Q. Did the journalists you directed serve other purposes? Did you use them for influence operations against other journalists, political figures, or other important associates?

A. All agents, including journalists, were employed for intelligence collection. Thy frequently had access to confidential information that could be quite useful. As for influence operations, during my time we used only a few journalists for this purpose. I would say that the majority of the journalists we directed were not used for influence operations. Only the most reliable individuals, and those with useful connections, were used in this capacity.

Q. How about recruitment? Did you use journalists to recruit other journalists?

A. I would say that it was very rare indeed when an agent could be used in this capacity. He could be used, however, to identify potential targets. Furthermore, if he was acquainted with a target, the agent could assist in gathering the kinds of information necessary to determine whether the target was vulnerable, and how you might catch him.

Q. How closely did headquarters monitor and evaluate journalist operations? What criteria were used to meausre effectiveness?

A. In the case of journalists, the criteria tended to be straightforward: the number of articles published, the quality of these articles, and where they appeared (i.e. whether they were published in a major newspaper). These were the general measures employed. Whether or not the articles persuaded the intended targets is much more difficult to determine, and is quite subjective. A forgery is a good example, as is overt propaganda. The immediate impat of these operations is often unclear. During my time, there was no highly developed system for measuring the immediate impact of disinformation exercises. All such operations were evaluated in terms of their cumulative effect on the target over time. This is the way Moscow and Prague approached such questions during the 1960s.